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The articles in this special issue on type-2 blindsight all arose from a three-day 
workshop at University College Dublin in May 2013. The project brought together 
empirical researchers and philosophers to address the often-overlooked issue of 
residual awareness in blindsight (type-2 blindsight). The result is a collection of 
papers that not only present an overview of the current empirical and theoretical 
work on type-2 blindsight, but also raise important questions for our understanding 
of methodological and conceptual issues concerning the attribution of awareness in 
psychophysics, the nature of visual perception and experience, and their underlying 
mechanisms. In this introduction, we first give a brief overview of the history of 
research into residual awareness following striate cortical damage and then 
summarize the contributions to this special issue. 
  
For well over 100 years, damage to the striate cortex (V1) has been known to result 
in severe impairments to vision, typically regarded as blindness. William James 
(1890) observed that: “Hemiopic disturbance comes from lesion of either one of [the 
striate cortices], and total blindness, sensorial as well as psychic, from destruction of 
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both” (p. 47). Early studies into residual vision in cases of cortical blindness focused 
on remaining conscious experience. George Riddoch (1917) showed that soldiers 
who were clinically blind in a part of their visual field after a bullet wound had 
caused damage to their visual cortex were conscious of high-contrast moving or 
flickering stimuli in their blind field (the 'Riddoch phenomenon'). It was claimed by 
some that there was always some residual functioning following damage to V1 
(Poppelreuter, 1917) but the assumption was that this was always associated with 
preserved visual experience.  
 
The same assumption was made in the animal literature. Residual visual functioning 
in monkeys with V1 damage has been systematically studied since the work of Munk 
in late 19th century Germany. Early studies showed that monkeys could detect, and 
discriminate between, visual stimuli despite bilateral removal of V1 (Kluver, 1942). 
Still, despite suggestions to the contrary (Cowey & Weiskrantz, 1963), it was 
assumed that residual conscious vision was being studied. By contrast, after damage 
to striate cortex the reports of human subjects was that they were rendered blind 
and could no longer see anything led to the understandable assumption that 
humans and monkeys differed with respect to the role of V1 in conscious visual 
awareness. It was not until the mid-seventies, with the introduction of behavioural 
experimental methodologies developed for primates, that it was discovered that 
some hemianopes had residual visual functioning in the absence of reported 
awareness (Pöppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; Richards, 1973). Weiskrantz and colleagues 
(Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 1974) coined the term 'blindsight,' 
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which they defined as “...visual capacity in a field defect in the absence of 
acknowledged awareness”. 
 
The publication of Weiskrantz’s findings caused an explosion of interest in 
blindsight in empirical and philosophical circles. The discovery of blindsight played 
a major role in undermining the standard assumption that performance and 
awareness were tightly correlated. It was hotly debated whether blindsight was a 
genuine phenomenon or merely an artifact of poor experimental methodology (see 
critiques such as Campion, Latto, & Smith, 1983; Fendrich, Wessinger, & Gazzaniga, 
1992; and responses such as those of Azzopardi & Cowey, 1997;  Kentridge, 
Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 1997 and Stoerig, Hübner, & Pöppel, 1985). The extent and 
complexity of the residual capacities that blindsight subjects could exhibit was also 
a matter of contention (see Cowey, 2004 for a review). In philosophical circles 
blindsight became a test case that any theory of the mind would have to be able to 
account for  (e.g., Block, 1995; Churchland, 1980; Dennett, 1991).  
 
The emphasis on residual visual functioning in the absence of acknowledged 
awareness (type-1 blindsight) often led people to overlook the fact that certain 
stimuli can elicit awareness in a subject’s blind field. This residual visual awareness 
has become known as ‘type-2 blindsight’ (Weiskrantz, Barbur, & Sahraie, 1995), and 
has been interpreted in many different ways. It is still common to make the error of 
thinking that there are ‘type-1 (standard) blindsight subjects’, and another subset of 
people, also with damage to V1, who are ‘type-2 blindsight subjects’. However, the 
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proper distinction is not between different subjects, but rather between different 
conditions of stimulus presentation. Most  subjects with blindsight, whose lesions 
do not extend to the extrastriate cortex, have ‘type-1 blindsight’ under some 
stimulus conditions and have ‘type-2 blindsight’ under others. Variations in the 
properties of a stimulus such as the contrast it makes with its background, the speed 
of its onset and offset, and its absolute luminance can result in blindsight subjects 
reporting awareness of that stimulus when it is presented in their blind field.  
 
One of the major concerns addressed in this special issue is whether type-1 and 
type-2 blindsight are really distinct phenomena. This raises difficult issues 
concerning the reliability of the measurement of awareness in empirical studies and 
the role that different neural areas play in the realization of conscious vision. A 
growing interest in the neural correlates of consciousness has lead to a particular 
emphasis on contrastive studies. Dissociations between aware and unaware 
conditions, with matched task performance, in subjects’ blind fields are thought to 
offer a 'pure contrast' between performance and awareness. Such pure contrasts are 
thought to be particularly useful for differentiating the brain areas implicated in 
conscious and unconscious processing (e.g., Sahraie et al., 1997). This approach has 
also been in evidence in the growing literature on 'blindsight' in normal subjects, 
which relies on either masking experiments (Kolb & Braun, 1995; Lau & 
Passingham, 2006) or simulating blindsight by use of transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) (Boyer, Harrison, & Ro, 2005; Jolij & Lamme, 2005). 
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The contributors to this issue have addressed four broad themes in their papers. 
The problem of measuring awareness (Heeks & Azzopardi, this issue; Balsdon & 
Azzopardi, this issue; Celeghin et al, this issue); the problem of determining whether 
an experience is visual in nature (Kentridge, this issue; Foley, this issue; 
MacPherson, this issue; Overgaard & Mogensen, this issue; Brogaard, this issue); the 
implication of type-2 blindsight for the philosophy of perception (MacPherson, this 
issue; Brogaard, this issue) and the anatomical bases of residual function and 
residual experience in blindsight (Silvanto, this issue; Celeghin et al, this issue; Elliot 
et al, this issue). We now summarise these contributions. 
 
Tarryn Balsdon and Paul Azzopardi (this issue) focus on methodological issues in a 
study by Lau & Passingham (2006) that claimed to show a dissociation between 
awareness and performance, similar to that found in blindsight patients, in normal 
subjects. Balsdon and Azzopardi provide compelling evidence that, once bias free 
measures of performance and awareness are used, there is no dissociation between 
awareness and performance in normal subjects. These concerns also relate to an 
attempt to investigate a pure contrast between type-1 and type-2 blindsight in 
patient GY (Sahraie et al., 1997) , which is susceptible to the same methodological 
criticism. Balsdon and Azzopardi cite earlier studies showing that while 
dissociations between performance and awareness with static stimuli could not be 
accounted for entirely in terms of bias, this was not the case with moving stimuli. 
This suggests that while type-1 and type-2 blindsight may be separable phenomena 
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in studies presenting static stimuli, response bias might account for the dissociation 
between awareness and performance with moving stimuli.  
 
Frances Heeks and Paul Azzopardi (this issue) raise similar methodological 
concerns regarding claims that performance and awareness can be dissociated 
when it comes to masked facial expressions. This study shows that the apparent 
dissociation between performance and perception of facial expression is also an 
artifact of response bias. Heeks and Azzopardi argue that these findings may 
undermine the now prevalent assumption that there are separate pathways 
mediating performance and awareness. This finding puts pressure on the idea that 
visual function and awareness can dissociate in normal subjects as they do in 
blindsight subjects. In turn, this suggests that there is something especially unusual 
about the mechanisms that subserve blindsight subjects’ residual capacities.  
 
The work of Azzopardi and his colleagues highlights just how critical the choice of 
measurement technique is in establishing awareness or its absence. The methods 
used to establish whether a visual stimulus can systematically influence behavior 
are also critical. Recent experiments, using methods for assessing awareness similar 
to those advocated by Azzopardi and his colleagues, apparently do demonstrate a 
blindsight-like dissociation between performance and awareness in normal 
observers (e.g. Norman, Heywood & Kentridge, 2013, in press). The masking 
methods in Norman’s studies are quite different from those employed by Azzopardi 
and, perhaps more importantly, evidence for processing of unseen stimuli is 
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revealed indirectly through effects on priming or the modulation of attention rather 
than directly through questioning subjects about the nature of the masked stimuli. 
The precise details of masking and directness of the method used to establish 
processing of the masked stimuli may be critically important.  
 
It is not at all clear that blindsight subjects' residual experiences are visual in nature.  
Significant differences are seen in subject's descriptions of their residual awareness. 
They have variously described their experiences as: a “feeling”; “as if a finger is 
pointing through the screen”; “as if there were a black shadow against a black 
background”; as “dark shadows”; “visual pin pricks”; “white halos”; or as being 
“similar to when you wave your hand in front of your closed eyes”. In characterizing 
blindsight subjects’ residual awareness, it is worth emphasizing that, while they 
often use visual terms to explain their experiences, they also often explicitly deny 
that their residual awareness is visual, or a genuine case of 'seeing.' Thus there is 
even disagreement on whether type-2 blindsight is a case of visual awareness or 
not. Type-2 blindsight is generally considered to be some form of non-visual (e.g., 
cognitive) awareness. This issue has raised debate in recent years (Brogaard, 2011; 
ffytche & Zeki, 2011; Overgaard & Grünbaum, 2011; Weiskrantz, 2009) and four 
articles in this special issue specifically address this question.  
 
Robert Kentridge (this issue) argues, on the basis of evidence about the residual 
visual processing that subserves type-1 blindsight, that type-2 blindsight should not 
be considered a case of residual visual experience. His central claim is that the 
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residual processing that subserves type-1 blindsight is qualitatively very different 
from that which subserves normal visual experience. Because of this, it is very 
unlikely that any residual experience would be in any way similar to that of normal 
visual experience. As a result, Kentridge argues, there is no good reason to hold that 
type-2 blindsight is a form of degraded normal visual experience. 
 
Fiona Macpherson (this issue) considers the importance of discussions about the 
structural features of experience for determining whether or not type-2 blindsight is 
a visual phenomenon. She argues that it is very difficult to establish any structural 
features of experience and, as such, there is no good reason to hold, on the basis of 
appeal to putative structural features, that type-2 blindsight is not visual. On the 
other hand, we cannot claim that type-2 blindsight must be visual purely on the 
basis of the distal stimulus or the neurophysiological underpinnings of the 
phenomenon. Macpherson proposes that the experiences associated with type-2 
blindsight may be like those associated with amodal completion or phantom 
boundaries. She concludes that type-2 blindsight is a form of perceptual experience, 
but not necessarily visual experience. One might, however, contrast this conclusion 
with reports about another neurological condition which MacPherson discusses. In 
cerebral achromatopsia patients lose colour vision as a consequence of cortical 
damage. Despite their loss of colour experience these patients still perceive the 
boundaries between regions of different colours quite consciously (Kentridge, 
Heywood & Cowey, 2004), so, at least in this case what might be thought of as a 
phantom contour, boundaries alone still evokes a clearly visual experience.  
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Robert Foley (this issue) argues that we should consider type-2 blindsight to be a 
visual phenomenon. He contends that type-2 blindsight meets a very demanding set 
of objective criteria for visual awareness. According to these criteria an experience 
counts as visual if it is: based on the right proximal stimulus; received through the 
eye; processed by pathways that are implicated in visual processing; and the type of 
processing also occurs in normal vision. Foley then considers and rejects an 
alternative account according to which type-2 blindsight is a form of cognitive 
awareness.  He concludes that we have good, if defeasible, reason to hold that type-2 
blindsight involves a highly degraded and abnormal form of residual visual 
awareness.  
 
Morten Overgaard and Jesper Mogensen (this issue) are also concerned with the 
nature of residual awareness in type-2 blindsight. They present a model (The REF-
CON model), which conceives of blindsight as a form of residual visual experience. 
The model offers an account of blindsight that appeals to the dynamic 
reorganization of levels of processing to explain both subjects’ reports that they do 
not see and the difference between type-1 and type-2 blindsight.  
 
If type-2 blindsight is a form of visual experience, this discovery could have 
significant consequences for a number of empirical and philosophical hypotheses. 
Two papers in this special issue focus on some of these consequences. Berit 
Brogaard (this issue) considers the consequences of type-2 blindsight being a form 
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of veridical visual experience for certain theories in the philosophy of perception. 
She argues that type-2 blindsight lacks particularity, fine-grainedness and 
transparency. According to Brogaard, this means that type-2 blindsight offers a 
counter-example to any form of direct realism that is committed to the claim that 
the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is object involving, transparent 
and fine-grained. Finally, Brogaard argues that the phenomenology of type-2 
blindsight is best understood as being determinable rather than determinate and 
that if visual experience can represent determinable properties, this suggests a 
solution to Block’s (2010) challenge to representational theories of perception. 
 
Juha Silvanto (this issue) addresses the question of whether V1 is necessary for 
visual consciousness. He argues that the evidence from blindsight contradicts both 
standard hierarchical models and models on which feedback to V1 is necessary for 
consciousness. Instead Silvanto proposes that the distinction between local and 
long-range processing can explain blindsight. On this account, the residual visual 
capacities that blindsight subjects exhibit are due to local processing of visual 
information in the extrastriate cortex. The lack of attendant conscious experience is 
the result of the extrastriate neurons being unable to establish inter-areal networks 
via neural synchrony.  He concludes that while extrastriate feedback to V1 is 
important for awareness, it is not uniquely associated with awareness.  
 
Two articles in this issue offer new insights into the mechanisms that subserve type-
1 and type-2 blindsight. Alessia Celeghin and colleagues (this issue) offer a novel 
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approach to investigating residual visual processing after damage to the visual 
cortex. This method differs from traditional forced-choice and indirect methods of 
investigating blindsight in that the subjects’ fast automatic responses to suddenly 
appearing visual stimuli were tested. Since the subject is not asked to choose a 
response, this method has the advantage of being a bias free means of assessing 
residual capacity. The authors then determine whether the automatic response is 
subserved by the subject’s ipsilesional or contralesional hemisphere. Celeghin and 
colleagues provide provisional evidence that the subjects’ capacity to respond 
automatically to unconsciously perceived cues is subserved by the contralesional 
hemisphere. This suggests that cortical or subcortical processing in the intact 
hemisphere may subserve some blindsight functions. 
 
Mark Elliott and colleagues (this issue) present evidence supporting the significant 
role that stimuli of a certain frequency play in promoting blindsight performance. 
They compare the perimetric maps of subjects before and after the presentation of 
flickering stimuli of the appropriate frequencies. They found that stimulation of the 
blind field with the appropriate frequency led to temporary increase of intact visual 
field size. Elliott and colleagues propose that stimulation at rapid frequencies 
encourages the oscillation, and consequent synchronization, of neurons in the 
surviving areas of the cortex, thus bringing about the residual visual capacity 
reported. They conclude that this may indicate that blindsight and normal sight 
depend on similar mechanisms when it comes to the dynamics of vision. This raises 
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the exciting possibility that blindness resulting from V1 damage could be 
rehabilitated, resulting in a recovery of normal vision.  
 
We hope that the new work presented in this special issue provides a summary of 
the many current views of this important phenomenon, and inspires further 
research that will add to our understanding of the relationship between visually 
guided behavior and visual experience. 
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